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A Beveridgean pension scheme invariably reduces the marginal return to labour, and will thus 
discourage labour. A Bismarckian scheme can do so only if it is not actuarially fair, or in the 
presence of credit rationing. In any case, the same pension contribution will discourage labour 
less if the scheme is Bismarckian than if it is Beveridgean. A Bismarckian scheme may even 
encourage labour. 
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The political discussion on the e⁄ects of pension policy appears to take
it for granted that a pension contribution is a tax on labour income,
and will thus discourage labour. Indeed, a series of empirical studies
￿nds a negative e⁄ect of pension contributions on either employment
or labour participation. See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1997),
Scarpetta (1996), Tullio (1987). The assumption is justi￿ed, and the
empirical ￿nding unsurprising, in countries that have given themselves
a Beveridgean pension system, because individual pension bene￿ts are
then unrelated to individual contributions, and the latter are thus e⁄ec-
tively an earmarked tax (the social security tax). Not so, however, in
countries where the pension system is essentially Bismarckian, and thus
characterized by a close link between bene￿ts and contributions. In such
countries, pension contributions are a form of mandatory saving, and we
can thus regard them as a tax only if, and to the extent that, they are
higher than would be required to obtain the same amount of retirement
income by other means.
The concept of an implicit pension tax dates back to L￿deke (1988)
and Sinn (1990). More recently, Murphy and Welch (1998) and Orszag
and Stiglitz (2000) also have come round to the idea. This theoretical
insight has sparked-o⁄a number of empirical studies aimed at measuring
the tax component of pension contributions; see, for example, B￿rsch-
Supan and Reil-Held (2001), and Fenge and Werding (2004). Disney
(2004) takes the empirical analysis further by attempting to estimate
the labour e⁄ects of the tax and the mandatory saving components of
pension contributions. The author ￿nds that, if composition is not con-
trolled for, pension contributions reduce participation as in the earlier
empirical studies mentioned. But, if both the tax and the saving com-
ponent are used as explanatory variables, the former has a negative, and
the latter a positive e⁄ect on female participation (male participation
appears to be insensitive to either).
If the age of retirement is an object of choice, the existence of a public
pension system may a⁄ect both the length of a person￿ s working life,
and the amount of labour that he will supply over a working life of any
given duration. Although there are analogies between the two decisions,
the issues involved and the way of dealing with them are actually quite
di⁄erent. The present note has the limited objective of analytically
deriving the labour distortion associated with compulsory participation
in a public pension scheme, assuming that the age of retirement is ￿xed.1
1For a theoretical analysis of the retirement decision, see Sheshinski (1978) and,
more recently, Cremer et al. (2004).
1We ￿nd that, while a Beveridgean scheme will always discourage labour,
a Bismarckian one need not do so, and may even have the opposite e⁄ect.
In any case, the same pension contribution will discourage labour less if
the scheme is Bismarckian, than if it is Beveridgean.
2 Individual decisions in the absence of a public
pension system
Let li denote the labour, ci
1 the working-age consumption, and ci
2 the


















where v (li) is the money-equivalent of the disutility of labour. The
functions ut (:) are assumed increasing and concave, and the function


















where si denotes i￿ s saving, bi his credit ration (positive or zero), wi his
wage rate, and r the market interest factor.














where ￿ is the Lagrange-multiplier of (4). The marginal disutility of
labour is thus equated to the wage rate. The MRS will be set equal to
r if the credit ration is not binding, higher if it is.
3 Stylized pension systems
Let us now introduce a compulsory pension system. This will reduce i￿ s
disposable income by the contribution ￿
i while he is of working age, and
increase it by the bene￿t ￿i when he is retired. The pension contribu-
tion is typically an increasing function of labour income, such that the













If the system is of the Beveridgean type, individual bene￿ts may be
the same for everyone, or vary with certain personal characteristics, but
are in any case unrelated to individual contributions. We shall simply
assume that
￿
i = ￿ (8)
for all i. By contrast, if the system is Bismarckian in nature, individual











The treatment of agent i is said to be actuarially fair if, at the time
of retirement, the expected value of his future bene￿ts is equal to the
capitalized value of the contributions made.2 This de￿nition is di⁄erent
from the one used in the literature, mentioned in footnote 1, that deals
with the choice of retirement age.3 In our two-period framework without
uncertainty, actuarial fairness simply means ￿i = ￿
ir. If i￿ s treatment is
more than actuarially fair, ￿i > ￿
ir, this agent is getting a present from
somebody. If it is less than actuarially fair, ￿i < ￿
ir, either he is being
obliged to make a present to somebody, or the scheme is badly run.
If the system is Beveridgean, it redistributes from high to low earners.
If the system is Bismarckian, the function ￿ (:) can be de￿ned so that
the system redistributes from the rich to the poor, does not redistribute
at all, or even redistributes from the poor to the rich.
The di⁄erence between the capitalized value of the contributions and











constitutes an implicit tax on individual i. If this di⁄erence is negative,
￿#





can be negative, zero or positive according to whether the scheme is
2This is to be interpreted as meaning that the actuarial value of future bene￿ts is
equal to the lump sum that the agent would have got, at the date of retirement, if he
paid into into a private fund, rather than into a public pension scheme. This lump
sum will thus be net of the costs and normal pro￿ts of the private fund manager.
3In that context, a pension system is said to be actuarially fair if it does not distort
the retirement decision. In the present one, actuarial fairness cannot be de￿ned by
reference to its e⁄ect on the decision to supply labour because, as we shall see, that
decision may be a⁄ected by factors extraneous to the design of the pension system.
3less than actuarially fair, actuarially fair or more than actuarially fair




cannot be greater than unity, because
that would imply that bene￿ts are decreasing in contributions, and thus
contradict (9).
In view of (8), the marginal return to money paid into a Beveridgean
scheme is always zero. In view of (10), the marginal return to the money










is always positive, but may be lower than, equal to, or higher than r
depending to whether the scheme is less than actuarially fair, actuarially
fair or more than actuarially fair to i.
4 Labour implications of alternative pension sys-
tems















If the system is Beveridgean, the agent supplies labour to the point
where the money equivalent of the marginal disutility of labour equals














Comparing (14) with (5), it is clear that the scheme will introduce a
wedge between the wage rate and the marginal take-home pay even if
the agent happens to be fairly treated.4 Therefore, a Beveridgean scheme
will always discourage labour.5
The e⁄ect of a Bismarckian system is less straight-forward, because
an increase in the amount of time worked will raise not only the take-
home pay, but also the pension. Consider ￿rst the case where the bene￿t
4It the scheme does not redistribute between cohorts, this will be true of persons
in the middle of the earnings distribution.
5Strictly speaking, we should be saying that the introduction of a Beveridgean
scheme without compensation will always discourage labour. With our utility func-
tion, there are no income e⁄ects on labour, and we need not distinguish between
compensated and uncompensated changes. With a more general utility function,
however, there could be income e⁄ects, that would reinforce the substitution e⁄ect
for agents in the lower part of the earnings distribution, but would tend to o⁄set it
for those in the upper part.













1 (wili ￿ v (li) ￿ si ￿ ￿(wili))=u0










If the agent is not credit rationed, his MRS will be equal to r, and
(15) will simplify to (5). There is then no tax wedge. Intuitively, that
is because, in the absence of credit rationing, a worker is indi⁄erent
between receiving a unit of money now, or r when he retires.
If i is credit rationed, by contrast, his MRS is higher than r. As
the expression in the large round brackets on the right-hand side of (15)
is then positive and lower than unity, the whole right-hand side of the
equation is smaller than wi, but larger than (1 ￿ ￿
0)wi. Therefore, an
actuarially fair Bismarckian system does not discourage labour decisions
directly. It may do so indirectly if saving decisions are distorted by credit
rationing. In any case, however, the tax wedge and thus the labour
distortion will be smaller than if the system were Beveridgean.
Consider next the case where the bene￿t formula is not actuarially













1 (wili ￿ v (li) ￿ si ￿ ￿(wili))=u0






























It is then clear that the system will discourage labour if i is paying an
implicit tax (#
0 > 0), encourage it if he is getting an implicit subsidy
(#
0 < 0).
If i is credit rationed, his MRS is greater than r. There are then two
possibilities. One is that the marginal return to money paid into the
pension scheme, [1 ￿ #
0 (￿(wili))]r, is smaller than r. As the product
between the expression in the large round brackets on the right-hand
side of (16) and ￿
0 (wili) is positive, we can interpret this product as a
tax wedge. That will necessarily be the case if i is paying an implicit
tax, but may be the case also if he is getting an implicit subsidy, and the
marginal return to money paid into the scheme is not su¢ ciently large.
The other possibility is that i is getting an implicit subsidy, and that
the marginal return to the contributions paid is high enough to make
the expression in the large round brackets on the right-hand side of (16)
change sign. If the expression becomes zero, there is no tax wedge. If
it becomes negative, the product between this expression and ￿
0 (wili) is
5not a tax wedge, but a labour premium. The system has then the e⁄ect
of encouraging labour, rather than discouraging it. Intuitively, that is
because the agent would like to equate his MRS to the marginal return
to money paid into the pension scheme, which is higher than the interest
factor. As he cannot borrow more from the market because his credit
is rationed, however, the only way he can ￿nance this lucrative form of
investment is by working more. In the presence of credit rationing, an
implicit pension tax will thus discourage labour, but an implicit pension
subsidy may (rather than will as in the absence of rationing) encourage
it.
The e⁄ects of the two types of pension system are illustrated in Figure
1 under the assumption that i￿ s pension contribution is a ￿xed propor-
tion of his earnings, and his pension bene￿t is a ￿xed proportion of his
contribution. The curve labelled MC is the plot of v0 (li). The curve
marked MB￿ plots the right-hand side of (14). Those labelled MB0 and
MB00 plot the right-hand side of (16) for (1 ￿ #
0)r respectively "low"
and "high". Since the MRS is decreasing in li, the expression in the
large round brackets on the right-hand side of (16) gets smaller as we
move from left to right. The e¢ cient amount of labour (the amount
supplied in the absence of a pension scheme, or if the bene￿t formula is
actuarially fair, and credit is not rationed) is denoted by l￿. The amount
supplied in the presence of a Beveridgean pension system is denoted by
l￿. That supplied in the presence of a Bismarckian one is denoted by
l0 if (1 ￿ #
0)r is smaller than the agent￿ s MRS, by l00 if it is larger. A
Beveridgean system will induce the agent to supply an ine¢ ciently low
amount of labour. A Bismarckian one may induce the agent to supply
either an ine¢ ciently low, or an ine¢ ciently high amount of labour. In
the second case, however, the distortion is likely to be small, because
the marginal disutility of labour increases with the amount worked.
5 Discussion and conclusion
We have found that public pensions will necessarily discourage labour
only if the system is of the Beveridgean type. As individual pension
bene￿ts are independent of individual contributions, the marginal return
to labour does in fact coincide with the marginal take-home pay, and any
pension contribution will thus reduce the incentive to supply labour. If
the scheme is of the Bismarckian type, by contrast, the marginal return
to labour is higher than the take-home pay. The labour decision can
then be distorted only if the scheme is not actuarially fair, or if the
agent is credit rationed. In either case, the labour distortion may take
either sign.
In the absence of credit rationing, a Bismarckian pension system will
6induce the agent to supply less labour if he is paying an implicit pension
tax (i.e., if he is less than fairly treated), more labour if he is getting
an implicit pension subsidy (i.e., if he is more than fairly treated). In
the presence of credit rationing, a Bismarckian system will induce a
person to supply less labour if the marginal return to the money paid in
contributions is lower than his marginal rate of substitution of present
for retirement consumption. That will always be the case if this person is
not getting an implicit pension subsidy, and may be the case even if he is.
A Bismarckian system will induce a person to supply more labour if the
implicit pension subsidy is large enough to make the marginal return to
this person￿ s contribution higher than his marginal rate of substitution.
It is generally assumed that pay-as-you-go pension systems, as all
public ones e⁄ectively are, cannot o⁄er returns comparable with those
available in the capital market ￿except perhaps at the very start, when
the early cohorts might be granted full pension bene￿ts despite not hav-
ing paid contributions for a full working life, or at all ￿and thus that
participation in any such scheme inevitably entails paying an implicit
tax. Available estimates indeed show that mature pension systems im-
pose an implicit tax on the average participant.6 Even so, it may still be
the case that some participants are getting an implicit subsidy. These
will invariably be among low paid workers if the system is Beveridgean,
but not necessarily if it is Bismarckian.7 In a Beveridgean system, how-
ever, everybody is discouraged from supplying labour, irrespective of
whether he is taxed or subsidized. In a Bismarckian one, by contrast,
those who pay an implicit tax are discouraged, but those who get an
implicit subsidy may be encouraged.
Irrespective of whether the labour distortion is positive or negative,
a distortionary pension system is always a source of ine¢ ciency. If the
labour distortion is positive, however, it is likely to be small, because
the marginal disutility of labour increases with the amount supplied.
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